National Development Banks in the BRICS: Lessons for the Post-2015 Development Finance Framework by Spratt, Stephen & Barone, B
www.ids.ac.uk
Po
lic
y B
R
IE
FI
N
G
 
ISSUE 93 • APRIL 2015
In 2015, the framework to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
will be agreed. As described in the outcome document of the United Nations 
(UN) Rio+20 conference, The Future We Want, the mobilisation and effective 
use of stable, sufficient and suitable development finance must be a crucial 
part of this framework. While there is now broad agreement that National 
Development Banks (NDBs) have the potential to contribute positively to 
development objectives, it is less clear how this can best be done in practice. 
As a contribution to this debate, this Policy Briefing summarises research on the 
experience of NDBs in the BRICS countries.
 National Development Banks 
 in the BRICS: Lessons for the 
 Post-2015 Development 
 Finance Framework
There are good reasons to think that 
National Development Banks (NDBs) 
should be central to the post-2015 
development financing framework. The 
2014 Asia-Pacific Outreach Meeting on 
Sustainable Development Financing, for 
example, stressed the importance of 
NDBs in providing long-term financing 
for infrastructure. The potential of NDBs 
in financing innovation and small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), and the vital 
countercyclical role they can play were 
emphasised by the Intergovernmental 
Committee of Experts on Sustainable 
Development Financing (ICESDF). 
Countercyclical lending takes place in a 
credit crunch, when private sector sources 
of finance dry up. It is a vital support for 
economic activity, which can reduce the 
depth of economic downturns and hasten 
recovery from recession. These reports 
will be important inputs to the Third 
International Conference on Financing for 
Development to be held in Addis Ababa 
in July 2015, where the potential of 
NDBs is likely to figure prominently. 
What is the origin and role of 
development banks in the BRICS? 
As well as their long record of success 
in developed countries like Germany, 
renewed interest in NDBs reflects the 
prominent role they have played in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa). Historically, NDBs in the 
BRICS focused on domestic infrastructure 
financing. Since the 2000s, however, 
some have emerged as international 
actors, financing exporters from their 
own countries, and infrastructure in other 
developing countries. In the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis, the NDBs of 
Brazil, China and Russia also played an 
important role, stepping in when private 
finance dried up.
Brazil
The Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) started operations in the 
1950s. Initially concentrated on 
infrastructure development, the 
focus expanded to include industrial 
development in the 1960s. BNDES has 
also become a major player in funding, 
and even helping shape industrial 
policy, including through support of 
innovative enterprises. In the 1990s, 
BNDES oversaw a broad privatisation 
programme of major publicly owned 
companies, often taking an ownership 
stake. From 2003, BNDES also began 
promoting the internationalisation of 
“Competition 
between 
traditional and 
new institutions 
should improve 
the options and 
terms available 
to borrowing 
countries.”
key productive sectors of the Brazilian economy. 
Most recently, BNDES acted as countercyclical 
lender between 2009 and 2011, expanding its 
total lending by 70 per cent.
Russia
Originally responsible for restructuring USSR 
liabilities, the Russian Bank for Development 
(VEB) evolved to oversee strategic investments 
in infrastructure and large export-oriented 
enterprises in Russia. Largely because of the 
countercyclical role described above, VEB 
increased its disbursement from US$4bn in 
2004 to US$16bn in 2011. 
China
The China Development Bank (CDB) was 
created following the 1994 government budget 
reform. The CDB played a key role in China’s 
rapid urban growth by providing asset-backed 
loans to Local Government Financing Vehicles 
(LGFVs) for large-scale urban infrastructure 
projects. Since the 2000s, the CDB has also 
supported state-owned firms to ‘go-global’, 
often linked to China’s strategic goal of securing 
natural resources. As well as providing credit 
lines to foreign buyers for the purchase of 
Chinese products, the CDB also grants loans 
on favourable terms to countries in exchange 
for long-term oil or gas supply agreements. As 
in Brazil, the CDB was the main countercyclical 
lender in China after the global financial crisis.
 
South Africa
Strategically redesigned and re-launched after 
the apartheid era, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) has also supported 
domestic infrastructure development. More 
recently, the DBSA has performed this role 
across the countries of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Within 
South Africa, the bank has provided credit 
to municipalities for basic infrastructure, and 
financed electrification programmes in remote 
rural areas. Contrary to NDBs in Brazil, China 
and Russia, however, the DBSA has not been 
able to act as a countercyclical lender due to the 
progressive deterioration of the bank’s assets, 
which was heavily impacted by the financial crisis.
 
India
Development banking in India is much more 
fragmented, with a number of specialised 
financial institutions. The main categories are:
• Industrial development banks – the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), the Industrial 
Development Bank of India (IDBI) and the Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI); 
• an agricultural development bank – the National 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD); the Export-Import Bank of India; 
• and housing development banks, such as the 
National Housing Bank (NHB). 
While not a development bank per se, the Exim 
Bank of India channels government credit for 
foreign buyers of Indian exporters.
What are the similarities and differences 
of the BRICS’ development banks? 
Similarities
The first common feature is that NDBs have 
traditionally supported each country’s influence 
within their region. BNDES has directed its 
operations towards Latin America and the 
Caribbean. China’s and India’s development 
banks have largely targeted neighbouring 
Asian countries, while Russia has operated in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) economies and South Africa in the 
SADC region. In recent years, this has begun 
to change. Particularly since 2007, Africa has 
seen increasing investments and development 
assistance from the BRICS, with their NDBs 
playing an important role. China and India have 
been the most pervasive across the continent, 
while Brazil has mostly focused on the former 
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and 
Angola. Russia has been less prominent. 
In their external operations the NDBs exhibit 
some common practices, particularly the 
principle of non-interference in recipient 
countries’ affairs, and a ‘mutual benefit’ view of 
development assistance. In this regard, off-take 
agreements for the purchase of goods from 
domestic companies by the foreign recipients of 
credit are a common feature of deals. 
Differences
The NDBs also differ in a number of important 
respects. First, the size of these institutions is 
very different. With US$1,205bn, the CDB has 
more than double the assets of all the other 
NDBs combined. 
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“Whilst the 
difficulties may 
be worse in 
lower income 
countries, 
attracting 
investment 
to these sort 
of activities is 
a problem in 
countries of all 
kinds.”
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Figure 1 NDBs assets in US$bn 
(as of December 2012) 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Barone and 
Spratt (2015).
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Second, the banks have different approaches to 
risk, as highlighted by their non-performing loans 
(NPLs). The CDB and BNDES operate rigorous 
risk assessments of the projects they finance, 
but this only explains part of the difference. 
NPL ratios measure the proportion of total loans 
that are judged to be at risk of default. Their 
very low NPLs are also related to the fact that 
they tend to finance large corporations rather 
than (riskier) SMEs. In contrast, VEB does not 
pursue financial sustainability and has a special 
programme for the financing of SMEs. While 
not publicly available, it is reasonable to assume 
that NPLs will be higher as a result. The poor 
performance of DBSA is largely the result of the 
2008 financial crisis, where it was exposed to a 
number of sectors that were badly affected. More 
recently, the DBSA has narrowed its operations to 
focus on infrastructure. This highlights the fact 
that different sectors carry different degrees 
of risk, irrespective of the stringency of the 
loan assessment process. The strategic choice of 
sectors where NDBs should concentrate their 
activities, thus brings implications for the amount 
of risk they will be required to hold. 
 
A third important difference is source of finance. 
BNDES and VEB have similar funding sources, 
both obtaining long-term, low-cost finance 
from pension funds and government bonds. The 
CDB issues low-interest bonds with long-term 
maturities, backed by the government. The 
DBSA issues bonds, receives lines of credit 
from multilateral and bilateral development 
finance institutions. Most of the resources of 
the Exim Bank of India, in contrast, come from 
market borrowing, making it more vulnerable to 
economic shocks and shifts in market sentiment.
Development banks’ potential to 
address funding gap for much needed 
development infrastructure
Currently, 1.4 billion people in the world have 
no electricity, 0.9 billion do not have clean 
drinking water, while 2.6 billion lack sanitation. 
The projected infrastructure investment shortfall 
is expected to exceed US$1tn per year by 
2020, which may increase by 50 per cent once 
the costs of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation are taken into account. 
Some of this additional finance could be 
provided by new multilateral development 
banks. The recently launched BRICS’ New 
Development Bank, and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, for example, may channel a 
share of their members’ huge foreign exchange 
reserves towards sustainable infrastructure. 
As well as reducing the infrastructure funding 
gap in developing countries, the shift this 
would cause in the global development finance 
landscape could also have other beneficial 
effects. Competition between traditional and 
new institutions, for example, should improve 
the options and terms available to borrowing 
countries. 
Much will depend on how these new banks 
operate in practice, and how institutions such 
as the World Bank adapt in response. Even in 
the best case scenario, however, the scale of 
the funding gap means that there will remain 
a big shortfall in infrastructure investment in 
developing countries. 
Well designed, managed and resourced national 
development banks will therefore be needed 
if post-2015 development goals are to be 
met. The experience of the BRICS shows that 
such institutions can supply affordable long-
term finance to key strategic sectors such as 
infrastructure, and perform vital countercyclical 
roles in national economies. 
Some of the design features needed to perform 
these roles can therefore be found in the 
experience of the BRICS and other developed 
and developing countries. What is less clear is 
how all of the pieces of the jigsaw should be 
fitted together in different country contexts. 
The post-2015 framework will not be just about 
growth, but about inclusive and sustainable 
growth. As they are driven by strategic 
mandates rather than (short-term) commercial 
considerations, NDBs are perfectly suited to 
supporting these goals. To do this, however, 
they need mandates which balance different 
development objectives, and the interests of 
different groups in society. This is not easy, 
and further research is needed so that NDBs 
can fulfil their potential as key development 
actors in the post-2015 development financing 
framework.
“By enabling more 
developmentally 
focused private 
investment, 
NDBs can also 
influence the 
evolution of 
financial sector 
development, 
strengthening its 
ability to serve 
the real economy 
and meet vital 
development 
goals.”
Figure 2 Non-performing loan ratio 
(as of December 2012)
Note: BNDES’s and CDB’s figures are reported as of June 2013. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Barone and 
Spratt (2015).
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Policy recommendations 
NDBs should support activities that create large developmental benefits but do 
not attract sufficient private investment, either because returns are not attractive 
enough, or risks are too high. Whilst the difficulties may be worse in lower income 
countries, attracting investment to these sorts of activities is a problem in countries 
of all kinds. One of the world’s most successful national development banks is KfW 
of Germany, for example, while Canada is home to a widely admired public SME 
bank. Given this, what policy lessons can countries of all kinds who are considering 
establishing an NDB learn from the experience of the BRICS?
Provide stable financing source for NDBs
Funding is central to ensuring that NDBs can do things that private financial 
institutions cannot or will not do. If NDBs are reliant entirely on commercial 
financing, they will face the same incentives as private institutions. If NDBs are to 
finance long-term infrastructure projects on affordable terms, a significant proportion 
of their revenues should be long-term, low-cost and insulated from market insecurity. 
Undertake countercyclical lending
Insulating funding sources from the market also allows banks to behave countercyclically, 
increasing lending when private finance falls. This is not just about the type of funding, 
however, but also its scale. To be able to offset a sharp reduction in the supply of private 
finance across the economy, NDBs need to be relatively large, with assets greater than 
5 per cent of GDP. They also need to take a long-term view of risk assessment. 
Clear mandate and effective monitoring framework
As well as being able to act countercyclically, NDBs need also to be willing to do 
so. This requires a clear mandate, which should specify strategic sectors and other 
objectives in areas like affordable access to services for the poor and environmental 
sustainability. Different sectors carry different risks. And NDBs’ risk tolerance should 
reflect this. To be effective, a clear monitoring framework is required to measure 
results and incentivise staff to improve outcomes in these areas. 
Support inclusive growth and exports
Successful NDBs focus on supporting economic growth in productive sectors 
through the provision of stable, affordable long-term finance and by supporting 
national exporters. The experience of the BRICS suggests that NDBs can successfully 
support exporters under various credit arrangements.
Rigorous loan approval process
Although sectors should be selected strategically, individual loans should be based 
on a rigorous assessment process. To be successful, NDBs need to minimise the level 
of NPLs, and a strong approval process also helps ensure that finance is allocated 
efficiently to productive enterprises and projects. 
Work with the private sector to leverage private finance and encourage a 
‘development-friendly’ financial sector
Funding long-term development projects is subject to significant risks and public 
development banks can mitigate these risks, increasing the flow of private finance. 
By enabling more developmentally focused private investment, NDBs can also 
influence the evolution of financial sector development, strengthening its ability to 
serve the real economy and meet vital development goals. 
Promote sustainable urban development
NDBs have supported structural change in the BRICS, with the role of the CDB in 
China being particularly significant. With two billion people projected to be moving 
to urban centres in the next three decades, the need for investments in urban 
infrastructure can only become more important. Public development banks appear 
uniquely well-suited to perform this role.
